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RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES, AND SOVEREIGNS
Katherine Florey*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Wuerth’s provocative article identifies a seemingly stark
incongruity: courts have held that foreign corporations are “persons” subject
to constitutional protections, while generally concluding that foreign
sovereigns are not. This seems jarring, particularly when—as Professor
Wuerth points out—the legal difference between a foreign corporation and a
foreign government is often technical rather than meaningful.1 To address
this disparity, Professor Wuerth proposes a new understanding of the
Constitution—particularly Article III and due process protections—as
encompassing not just non-sovereign entities like the “Daimler Corporation
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization” but nations such as Germany
and Israel.2
While adopting this interpretation could have sweeping implications,3
Professor Wuerth’s primary focus is on protections associated with personal
jurisdiction,4 and her proposed new framework would not, she argues,
require a radical change in current law. Rather than locating the specific
content of protections for foreign nations in the Constitution itself, she argues
that personal jurisdiction standards for foreign nations could be set by
Congress—and, further, that they could reasonably be very modest.5 The
important aspect of such protections, she emphasizes, would be their
consistent application.6

* Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law.

1. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign
Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 644 (2019) (noting that “[state-owned enterprises] are not
treated as the equivalent of foreign states unless a high ‘alter ego’ standard is met”).
2. Id. at 635.
3. Professor Wuerth notes, for example, that some scholars have “worried that affording
due process rights to foreign states could hamstring U.S. responses to a foreign policy crises.”
Id. at 686. Wuerth is sympathetic to these concerns and believes that a narrower understanding
of foreign nations’ due process rights is therefore appropriate. See id. at 686–87.
4. While Article III is not generally regarded as encompassing personal jurisdiction
protections, Professor Wuerth challenges that view. See id. at 673–74. Note, however, that
Wuerth also argues that while “[t]he Constitution might require personal jurisdiction . . .
international or general law might set out the actual rules of personal jurisdiction.” See id. at
648.
5. See id. at 684–85 (discussing how a view of sovereigns as constitutionally protected
could be incorporated fairly seamlessly into current doctrine).
6. Id. at 682.

74

2019]

RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES, AND SOVEREIGNS

75

So what’s not to like about a change that would, without greatly disrupting
current doctrine, perhaps ground it on a more solid foundation? In many
respects, nothing. When it comes to certain basic due process and separation
of powers protections, Professor Wuerth makes a compelling case that it is
not only illogical but inconsistent with courts’ actual decision-making to hold
foreign nations outside their sway.7
At the same time, a notable omission hangs over Professor Wuerth’s
proposed new understanding. Since the Constitution’s inception, the main
avenue of protection for foreign nations has been not constitutional due
process but foreign sovereign immunity. Until the State Department’s
adoption of the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity, the shield
provided by foreign sovereign immunity was generally more potent than
current minimum-contacts-based personal jurisdiction protections.8 Further,
as Professor Wuerth discusses, sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction
were for many years closely linked concepts.9 While current doctrine does
not fully reflect this close link,10 foreign sovereign immunity continues to
safeguard substantially the same interests that personal jurisdiction limits do.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, passed in its original form in 1976,11
ensures that there are few circumstances under which foreign nations without
significant commercial contacts with the United States can be compelled to
appear.12 Moreover, foreign sovereign immunity protections are rooted in
principles of general and international law, which Wuerth suggests should
also shape our understanding under her proposed framework.13
The law of foreign sovereign immunity is well entrenched both in
historical practice and in current law, and—given that it is currently a lever
controlled by Congress—there is little reason to think that, in the scenario
envisioned by Professor Wuerth, a congressionally created set of personal
jurisdiction protections would function much differently in practice. At the
same time, there are potential hazards in importing current personal
jurisdiction ideas—as applied to foreign nations or otherwise—into the
7. As Wuerth points out, for example, the Court, in cases like Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), has appeared to assume without analysis that separation of powers
protections apply to foreign entities. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 651. Similarly, it is hard to
imagine that the Constitution does not in some manner protect proceedings involving foreign
sovereigns from being tainted by obvious bias or procedural irregularity.
8. Foreign sovereigns, that is, were potentially immune for all conduct, even commercial
activities that had a significant connection to the United States. See Lawrence A. Collins, The
Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
119 (1965).
9. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 664.
10. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 395 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting, in the state sovereign immunity context, that sovereign
immunity is “hybrid” in nature but could be made fairer by being seen in a light similar to
personal jurisdiction).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
12. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
13. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 648 (suggesting that, while the basic requirement that
personal jurisdiction be present might be mandated by the Constitution, “international or
general law might set out the actual rules of personal jurisdiction”).
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already unwieldy world of Article III jurisprudence. Professor Wuerth has
ably identified inconsistencies in the law and makes a compelling case that
the constitutional place of foreign nations deserves reexamination. Yet any
theory of their constitutional place should take account of the way in which
foreign sovereign immunity has worked both historically and in the present
to protect them.
This response first looks at the historical understanding of foreign
sovereign immunity and the ways in which it should inform our reading of
Article III. It then considers the role that sovereign immunity protections for
foreign nations currently play. It closes with a suggestion that—while the
sovereign immunity regime is largely adequate to protect other nations’
interests—Professor Wuerth’s insights nonetheless have a role to play in our
understanding of cases involving foreign sovereigns.
I. THE HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Professor Wuerth notes that, at the time the Constitution was drafted and
ratified, the idea that foreign sovereigns could be haled into court against
their will was virtually unthinkable.14 More controversially, she argues that
Article III incorporated “procedural protections,” including personal
jurisdiction, that apply to “litigants . . . including foreign states.”15
Much of Professor Wuerth’s argument rests on the idea that, because
foreign sovereigns could not be sued without their consent, claims against
them could not constitute a constitutional “case.”16 The early linkage of
foreign sovereign immunity, concepts of amenability to service, and Article
III “cases” is well established. As Professor Caleb Nelson has argued in an
influential article that Professor Wuerth discusses, early conceptions of
sovereign immunity—whether applied to U.S. states,17 the federal
government,18 or foreign nations19—are difficult to disentangle from
doctrines of personal jurisdiction.20 In the early United States, “the court’s
ability to proceed to judgment depended on its ability to command the
defendant’s appearance”—yet “[u]nder the general law of nations,
sovereigns were thought to enjoy a broad exemption from command.”21 As
a result, as Nelson further argues, disputes involving nonconsenting states
could not—under existing law—turn into “cases” within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution because there was no means by which they

14. See id. at 662–63.
15. See id. at 656.
16. See id.
17. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1574–79 (2002).
18. See id. at 1584.
19. See id. at 1588–89.
20. See id. at 1574–75 (explaining how the doctrine of sovereign immunity derived from
limits on sovereigns’ amenability to suit, in the sense of the court’s power over the defendant’s
person).
21. Id. at 1574.
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could come under a court’s jurisdiction.22 Importantly, however, Nelson also
argues—and other commentators have agreed to varying extents23—that the
Constitution does not impose this limit in itself. Rather, “background
principles of general law” simply ensured that, as a practical matter, there
was no effective way for a plaintiff to sue a resistant sovereign and thus create
a “case.” 24
Although Nelson’s analysis is focused on states, disputes involving foreign
nations appear to have been regarded in a similar way.25 The Supreme Court
first considered the foreign sovereign immunity issue in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon,26 a case involving two Americans’ claims to a
Philadelphia-docked vessel that France had repurposed as a warship.27 The
Schooner Exchange draws general analogies between the immunities of
foreign nations and states, alluding to the state-sovereign-immunity
controversies that gave rise to the Eleventh Amendment28 in discussing
whether France could be subject to jurisdiction in the United States.29 More
specifically, however, the Schooner Exchange Court suggested that the issue
was one of background legal principles—in this case, international law
norms—that the Constitution had not altered as opposed to an affirmative
proscription that the Constitution had enacted. Observing that there was “no
municipal law, nor any practical construction by the executive, the
legislative, or the judicial department of our government, which authorizes
the jurisdiction now claimed,” the Court concluded that “we can only have
recourse to the law of nations,” which “requires the consent of the
sovereign . . . before he can be subjected to a foreign jurisdiction.”30
Professor Wuerth is fully cognizant of this historical connection between
sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction. Her interpretation, however,
diverges somewhat from the “background principle” view discussed above.
As Wuerth sees it, Article III constitutionalized some limits on personal
22. See id. at 1587–89.
23. Many commentators, that is, accept the idea of state sovereign immunity as a
background principle or a matter of federal common law, although some see the doctrine as a
whole in a somewhat different light than Nelson. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 84 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing state sovereign immunity as a matter
of federal common law subject to congressional modification).
24. See Nelson, supra note 17, at 1627–28 (noting that sovereign immunity can be
“trace[d] . . . to background principles of general law rather than to anything that the
Constitution affirmatively enshrined”). An important implication of the view that the limits
on sovereigns’ amenability to suit do not derive from Article III itself is that they are
potentially subject to change by Congress, provided that Congress is otherwise acting within
its Article I powers. See id. at 1627–29.
25. See id. at 1588–89.
26. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
27. See id. at 118–19.
28. See id. at 124 (suggesting that the general view was that “a state could not be subjected
to judicial process, unless by the words of the Constitution of the United States” and noting
that “when it was finally decided in the Supreme Court of the United States that a suit might
be maintained against a state in the Federal Courts, the states amended the constitution so as
not to admit of that construction”).
29. See id. at 124.
30. See id. at 125.
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jurisdiction, including but not limited to jurisdiction over nonconsenting
foreign nations. Wuerth notes that the “judicial power vested by Article III
had personal jurisdiction . . . defenses baked into it.”31 Wuerth, that is,
suggests that the Constitution affirmatively incorporated the then current
understanding that sovereigns were not amenable to suit into its definition of
the Article III judicial power. She argues that “Article III . . . required
personal jurisdiction and notice,” protections that belonged to the
“Constitution’s structural limitations on federal power.”32 This view of the
“judicial power” is thus subtly different from the view that eighteenthcentury limits on amenability to process were a background reality
independent of the Constitution33 subject to alteration by Congress as long
as it acts within Article I limits.34 It is also different from the way in which
today’s Supreme Court has generally understood both The Schooner
Exchange and the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity more broadly,
which the Court has characterized as a matter of comity, not constitutional
demand.35
Wuerth makes other historical arguments for why foreign sovereigns
should have constitutional protections; among others, she contends that some
historical evidence exists that foreign sovereigns would have been regarded
as constitutional “persons” subject to the Due Process Clause.36 But her
understanding of Article III is a centerpiece of her case.37 At the same time,
Wuerth sees the implications of the Article III interpretation as less sweeping
than might be expected. This is because, as she argues, the content of the
limits that Article III imposes on foreign sovereigns is not fixed by the
Constitution.38 She explains, for example, that Congress may choose to
provide for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
31. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 668–69.
32. See id. at 669.
33. Because at the time there was no means of summoning unconsenting sovereigns to
court, the Founders simply assumed that no “Cases” involving them would arise. Even so,
Nelson argues, “the Constitution nowhere declares that legislatures cannot override those
[background] principles and subject states to compulsory process at the behest of individuals.”
See Nelson, supra note 17, at 1628. As a corollary to this, Nelson argues that the Constitution,
with the exception of the particularized limit of the Eleventh Amendment, does not limit
Congress’s ability to subject unconsenting states to suit, provided Congress acts within the
scope of its Article I powers. Id. at 1567, 1626–28.
34. Id. at Part II.B (summarizing arguments for and against construing Article I to allow
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity). Notably, the arguments Nelson elaborates
for the no-power-to-abrogate view rest on the idea that the Constitution does not give Congress
“the power to command state legislatures” in certain ways—an argument that would
presumably have less force outside the vertical federalism context. See id. at 1642.
35. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“As
The Schooner Exchange made clear, . . . foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and
comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”).
36. While an extended discussion of this argument is beyond the scope of this response,
it is worth noting that—while Professor Wuerth does identify important incongruities in
failing to apply due process protections to some aspects of foreign-sovereign litigation—the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity exerts some protective effects here as well.
37. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637 (describing Article III as protecting foreign
sovereigns even if the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not).
38. See id. at 683.
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sovereigns and that, so long as those standards are applied consistently, they
do not offend any constitutional principle.39
Because of this, the ways in which Wuerth’s view differs from the
“background principle” view of sovereign immunity are functionally and
perhaps theoretically modest. The scholarly consensus, that is, suggests on
the one hand that the Founders believed that suits against unconsenting
sovereigns were impossible under then current law, yet—on the other hand—
that Congress today nonetheless has the power to alter that background
reality. If that is the case, what does it matter whether foreign sovereign
immunity was incorporated into Article III or was simply a background, nonconstitutional reality?
As technical as this distinction may seem, however, it is a potentially
important one. Courts take Article III limits seriously, and entangling
personal jurisdiction with Article III seems likely to confuse and complicate
an already complex area of law as, arguably, adding an Article III dimension
has with the standing doctrine.40 We should be reluctant, as a result, to
broaden Article III’s reach—especially so when the historical evidence is, as
it is here, ambiguous about what Article III requires. True, contemporaneous
judicial opinions and commentary emphasized that the Constitution did not
of its own force grant federal courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. But
such sources generally stop short of casting Article III as containing an
explicit prohibition on such jurisdiction; rather, they simply note that neither
the Constitution nor any other source purports to alter longstanding principles
of international law.41 Given the lack of unmistakable historical evidence
that Article III affirmatively incorporated personal jurisdiction limits as a
limit on the “judicial power,” reading Article III to incorporate them seems
potentially imprudent.
The story of state sovereign immunity provides an apt cautionary tale: for
many years, the doctrine was widely seen as a background principle, subject
to abrogation by Congress, rather than a structural constitutional limitation
on the federal judicial power.42 The Court’s new understanding of sovereign
immunity as a constitutional limitation on courts’ power was immensely
controversial,43 and it is hard to see how it has improved state sovereign
39. See id. at 636.
40. See Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 699 (2010) (“In a series of revolutionizing Supreme Court
opinions, the law of standing shifted from its common law legal interest origins to a . . .
constitutional requirement derived from the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Article III.”)
41. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 125 (1812).
42. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201,
1204–05 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court has, in recent years, erroneously come to
regard state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle, leading to the doctrine’s
problematic expansion).
43. See, e.g., id.; Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699 (2002); Carl
Tobias, Unmasking Federalism, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1833 (2003); Ernest A. Young, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2; see also College
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999)
(suggesting that the Court has continued to spar over the historical role of sovereign immunity
with “a degree of repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods”). Reviewing all
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immunity doctrine; rather, it has introduced into it historical and theoretical
muddle, rigid and unnecessary limitations on Congress’s powers, and jerryrigged exceptions to those limitations in areas where they would be
practically disastrous.44
Professor Wuerth, to be sure, does not advocate this outcome; instead, as
noted, she proposes a flexible, congressionally modifiable doctrine that could
even be made consistent with modern case law.45 But this view would mesh
somewhat awkwardly with Article III’s heavy machinery,46 and it would
create layers of complexity not just in the realm of foreign sovereign
immunity but personal jurisdiction doctrine more generally. This is
because—as Professor Wuerth recognizes47—her historical understanding
would suggest that not just immunity protections but all limits on personal
jurisdiction are embedded in the constitutional understanding of the “judicial
power.”48 The implications of such a new understanding, particularly given
the current confused state of personal jurisdiction doctrine, could be
profoundly disruptive and unpredictable, and even a strictly originalist view
of Article III’s text does not demand it.
II. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT
The previous section has argued both that there are risks in reading new
limits into our interpretation of Article III’s “judicial power” and that
historical and textual evidence does not require us to do so. Of course, if our

these criticisms and assessing their validity is beyond the scope of this response; nonetheless,
they suggest some of the perils of adding new constitutional limits on federal courts’
jurisdiction.
44. See, e.g., Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (holding
that Congress may abrogate aspects of state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Clause, despite earlier case law suggesting that Congress’s Article I powers were ineffective
for this purpose).
45. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 685–86 (suggesting new reasoning that might preserve
the results in existing case law).
46. See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,”
and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
765, 775 (2008) (noting disruptive effects of courts’ treatment of state sovereign immunity as
an Article III doctrine).
47. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637–38 (arguing that Article III only provides for
jurisdiction over “cases” in which personal jurisdiction and notice are both proper, “as a matter
of separation of powers, not due process”).
48. Personal jurisdiction doctrine has already been amply criticized for being ambiguous
in its purpose and for meshing imperfectly with the due process protections in which it is
supposedly rooted. See, e.g., Steven Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1255
(2017) (“The pitched battles of modern jurisdiction doctrine . . . haven’t been solved by staring
harder at the words ‘due process of law.’”). Indeed, Professor Wuerth herself notes that
current personal jurisdiction doctrine is an “incoherent mess.” Wuerth, supra note 1, at 682.
Yet while our current, due process-based notion of personal jurisdiction may be unsatisfactory,
it is not clear that introducing Article III and separation of powers concerns into the personal
jurisdiction analysis would provide clarity. Sachs, for example, suggests re-orienting the
doctrine toward general and international law, the same principles on which early notions of
foreign sovereign immunity also rested. See Sachs, supra, at 1319.
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existing constitutional understanding were inadequate to the task of
protecting foreign sovereigns’ interests, this calculus might change.
Professor Wuerth argues, however, that the Constitution itself provides
only “minimal” protections for foreign sovereigns—what she calls
“positivist” restrictions, or the idea that the Constitution does not dictate any
specific personal jurisdiction protections but only requires that whatever
rules exist are followed uniformly.49 Thus, even under Professor Wuerth’s
proposed view, Congress would have the primary role in crafting protections
for foreign sovereigns.50 Yet, in a sense, Congress already does exactly this.
Statutory sovereign immunity protections are already adequate to protect
sovereigns’ interests in a variety of situations and, indeed, provide safeguards
remarkably similar to what personal jurisdiction limits might offer.51
Further, to the extent Congress sometimes overreaches, it is not clear that a
more expansive view of Article III limits would provide meaningful
restraints.
The idea that Congress should have the primary role in setting the bounds
of foreign sovereign immunity is less than a half-century old.52 For many
years, courts dismissed cases against foreign sovereigns when the State
Department made “suggestions” of immunity.53 Indeed, the Supreme Court
suggested that, given the “guiding principle” that “the courts should not so
act to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs,” it would
be inappropriate for courts “to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
government has not seen fit to recognize.”54 Yet inconsistent State
Department practice led to the area being dominated by an unsatisfactory
“amalgam of judicial decisions, Executive Branch policies, some uncertain
notions of international law and wholly inadequate procedure.”55 In
response, Congress, in 1976, enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) in an effort to “set forth consistent guidelines for determining
sovereign immunity.”56
The FSIA reads as an affirmative grant of immunity to sovereign nations,
providing that, subject to some exceptions, “a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.”57
49. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 684.
50. See id. at 685–86.
51. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 55.
53. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983).
54. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
55. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 905 (1969); see also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488
(noting various factors that made the operation of foreign sovereign immunity unclear preFSIA, including political pressures by friendly nations to expand the doctrine in individual
cases and the failure of some nations to go through the State Department).
56. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does It Matter?: Personal
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 115, 119 (2001).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
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Yet it in fact codifies the “restrictive theory” of foreign sovereign
immunity,58 first articulated in the 1950s, which represented a departure from
earlier practice under which foreign nations enjoyed immunity for both
private and public acts.59 Thus, the FSIA has two effects, pointing in
somewhat opposite directions: it codifies the previously contingent, casespecific doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, thus providing greater
certainty in cases where it applies. At the same time, it cements the narrower
understanding of the doctrine that took hold only in the mid-twentieth
century.60
Despite the limits on the sovereign immunity protections it recognizes,
however, the FSIA ensures that, for the most part, U.S. courts do not have
jurisdiction61 to hear cases against foreign-sovereign defendants. Of course,
“for the most part” is not always. The FSIA has exceptions, to be sure, and
subsequent amendments have further limited its reach.62 Yet while the
problems that Professor Wuerth identifies are real, it also bears emphasizing
that, as to the majority of claims that might be brought against foreign
sovereigns, the FSIA provides an effective shield. In particular—as the
following discussion will explain—the FSIA ensures that foreign-sovereign
entities are subject to suit in the United States without minimum contacts
only in somewhat unusual situations.
To understand why this is the case, it may be helpful to review the FSIA’s
somewhat complicated provisions and amendments. First, the FSIA is
phrased in explicitly jurisdictional terms, providing that “a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States” unless an exception is met.63 The FSIA also includes a broad removal
provision, allowing any state civil actions to be removed to federal court by
a foreign-sovereign defendant even if the underlying claims are based in state
law, thus “ensur[ing to foreign sovereigns] immunity from the jurisdiction of
state courts” as well, where none of FSIA’s exceptions apply.64 Thus, the
FSIA broadly shields foreign sovereigns from both federal and state court
jurisdiction.
The FSIA, however, includes a number of exceptions, all of which
originally—in contrast to exceptions added by later amendment—required
some territorial link to the United States.65 Perhaps the most important of
58. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
59. See Collins, supra note 8, at 119. The restrictive theory first became official U.S.
policy more than two decades before the FSIA’s enactment through the 1952 Tate Letter, a
statement of State Department policy. See id.
60. See id.
61. See infra note 64.
62. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 127–28.
63. 28 U.S.C § 1604 (2008).
64. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
65. Halverson, supra note 56, at 123 (noting that the same principle does not apply to
later-enacted exceptions); see id. at 121 (“It is significant that each of the exceptions to
immunity under the 1976 statute (other than the waiver and maritime lien exceptions) contains
a jurisdictional nexus requirement—that is, a requirement that the property at issue or the
conduct surrounding the claim bears a territorial connection to the United States.”)
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these is the exception that codifies the restrictive view, holding foreign
sovereigns susceptible to suit for commercial activity that is either “carried
on in the United States by the foreign state,” involving “an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere,” or relating to an external act related to commercial activity that
“causes a direct effect in the United States.”66 This exception, which the
FSIA’s declaration of purpose notes is intended to align U.S. doctrine with
international law,67 is indeed wide-ranging. Yet it also requires a significant
territorial nexus that ensures that foreign sovereigns conducting commercial
activity are unlikely to be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in
situations where equivalently situated private entities would not be.68 That
is, specific personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is normally
available in situations that map the FSIA’s nexus requirement: suits arising
out of ongoing U.S. commercial activity, U.S. activities closely linked to the
foreign conduct at issue, or foreign activities clearly traceable to U.S.
effects.69 Indeed, Congress appears to have included the nexus provision
precisely in order to ensure consistency with personal jurisdiction limits.70
The required FSIA nexus is not, of course, perfectly coextensive with
limits on personal jurisdiction, especially as the latter doctrine has evolved
in recent years.71 The territorial ties required by the FSIA relate to the United
States as a whole, meaning that it is possible that a foreign sovereign could
have contacts with multiple states but not enough with any single one to
constitute minimum contacts with any one state. By contrast, personal
jurisdiction analysis in many situations assesses contacts on a state-by-state
basis, a rule that has frequently had the effect of protecting foreign
corporations whose contacts may be spread across several states rather than
targeted at one.72 This slight disparity is mitigated, however, by the fact that
many federal statutes often invoked against foreign entities provide for

66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
68. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 122 (noting that in the FSIA as originally enacted,
the “intent of Congress . . . was to treat foreign state defendants [similarly] to other ‘persons’
who are entitled to due process protection” for personal jurisdiction purposes).
69. See id. (noting the “close correlation between the jurisdictional nexus requirement in
the statute and the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of International Shoe”). Of course, later
amendments did not continue to require this close connection in all circumstances.
70. See id.
71. The Supreme Court, for example, has strictly limited the use of general jurisdiction.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The Supreme Court has also emphasized
that U.S.-wide contacts may not suffice to support personal jurisdiction in any one state. See
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880-81 (plurality opinion).
72. See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 898 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the
anomaly that “a foreign manufacturer who targeted the United States (including all the States
that constitute the Nation)” may not be subject to personal jurisdiction in any particular state).
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nationwide jurisdiction,73 as do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
certain situations.74
Some later-added exceptions to the FSIA, however, do not require a
territorial nexus75 and have occasioned concern that they may go too far in
allowing U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over far-flung events involving
foreign nations.76 Early examples of such exceptions were a 1988
amendment allowing foreign states to be sued to enforce arbitration
agreements77 and provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 creating an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for
certain terrorist and other unlawful acts perpetrated by foreign
governments.78 The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA),
enacted in 2016,79 controversially expands this exception80 to clarify that it
applies to extraterritorial acts that contribute to terrorist activity in the United
States.81
Finally, in some cases, the FSIA simply does not apply because an entity
is insufficiently “sovereign”82 or because a corporation, while perhaps linked
with a sovereign government to some degree, is not characterized by the
required degree of government control to trigger sovereign immunity
protections.83 Such enterprises are, unlike foreign sovereigns themselves,

73. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that
courts consider contacts with the U.S. as a whole in the minimum contacts analysis when
analyzing federal statutes under which Congress has provided for nationwide service of
process); In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust, No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 2015
WL 6243526 (Oct. 20, 2015), at *23 & n. 39 (emphasizing same point and noting that it does
not seem inconsistent with recent Supreme Court case law).
74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (providing that service of a summons “establishes personal
jurisdiction” over a defendant who is not subject to jurisdiction in any state, where the exercise
of jurisdiction is consistent with the U.S. Constitution).
75. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 123. See also Wuerth, supra note 1, at 640 (noting
that the FSIA “has been repeatedly amended to reduce the immunity to which foreign states
are entitled”).
76. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 127–28.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2008).
78. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 116–17.
79. Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016).
80. See Dan Cahill, Student Note, The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: An
Infringement on Executive Power, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1699, 1714 (2017); Congress Overrides
Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 156,
157 (2017).
81. See Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism
Act, supra note 80, at 156–57. As commentators have noted, however, it does not create a
way to enforce any successful judgments through attachment, meaning that its utility to
terrorism victims may be limited. See Lisa Ann Johnson, Note, JASTA Say No: The Practical
and Constitutional Difficulties of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 231, 236 (2018).
82. See, e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
83. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003) (finding no immunity
for “companies [that] were, at various times, separated from the State of Israel by one or more
intermediate corporate tiers”).
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treated as constitutional “persons” entitled to due process.84 The distinction
between an entity closely enough connected to a foreign government to be
treated as an extension of it and one that is not may be quite technical.85
Professor Wuerth suggests in consequence that subjecting these two
categories of enterprises to different legal standards is problematic.86
It should be noted, however, that the personal jurisdiction protections that
both categories receive, while admittedly not identical, are similar.
Enterprises not directly controlled by the foreign state are subject to
jurisdiction following a normal minimum-contacts analysis.87 The foreign
state and closely related entities enjoy sovereign immunity that likewise
protects them from the jurisdiction of U.S. state and federal courts unless
they engage in commercial activities and meet a territorial nexus—one that
was adopted to mimic the minimum-contacts standard—or one of the FSIA’s
other exceptions applies.88 Thus, when we speak about foreign entities being
subject to suit without minimum contacts with the United States, we are
primarily concerned about the FSIA’s later-added exceptions.
While this concern is real, it is also relatively narrow. The FSIA continues
to shield foreign sovereigns from suit for the vast majority of their
noncommercial activities and their commercial activities conducted without
direct connection to U.S. territory.89 Of course, the FSIA is statutory, not
constitutional, so there is no guarantee that Congress might not, in the future,
go dangerously far in eroding foreign sovereign immunity protections;
indeed, it might be argued that in some areas, Congress has already gone too
far.90 Nonetheless, some constraints continue to exist on Congress.
Congress’s existing conception of foreign sovereign immunity has been
highly informed by international norms and background principles91—the
very considerations that Professor Wuerth suggests are proper for Congress
to take into account.92 Other branches of government also retain means of
influencing the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. Insofar as foreign

84. See Livnat, 851 F.3d at 56 (holding that the Palestinian Authority was not a sovereign
protected by the FSIA and hence the “usual personal-jurisdiction doctrine” requirements
should apply to it under the Fifth Amendment).
85. See, e.g., Dole, 538 U.S. at 470–480.
86. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 643 (noting disparity in treatment between state-owned
enterprises and otherwise similar foreign corporations).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
91. Indeed, the FSIA, at least in its original form, has been frequently described as
codifying existing international law principles in effect at the time of its passage. See, e.g.,
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319-20 (2010) (“[O]ne of the primary purposes of the FSIA
was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which Congress recognized as
consistent with extant international law.”); Stephens v. National Distillers and Chemical
Corp., 69 F.3d 1226 1234 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he FSIA . . . primarily codif[ied] pre-existing
international and federal common law.”).
92. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 647–48 (suggesting that the Constitution might require
that personal jurisdiction be present, but that international or general law might govern the
specifics of when personal jurisdiction is proper).
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sovereign immunity (or other jurisdictional) protections may be rooted in
international law,93 the Charming Betsey canon of construction—that “an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains”94—functions to prevent accidental
overreach. Likewise, the Executive Branch can provide input to Congress in
situations where a rollback of sovereign immunity might hinder international
relations.
To be sure, Congress may choose to intentionally skirt such limits, as
arguably it did when it dismissed Executive Branch objections and overrode
President Obama’s veto to pass JASTA.95 But if Congress is overly willing
to expand U.S. jurisdiction over foreign nations, it is not clear that Professor
Wuerth’s proposal provides a clear solution. Wuerth suggests that it may be
the case that “due process protects foreign states[,] but due process only
entitles them to what Congress gives them.”96 It is nevertheless unclear how
this differs significantly from Congress’s existing de facto control over the
scope of foreign sovereign immunity. Perhaps Congress might take its
responsibility more seriously if its protections for foreign nations were more
clearly grounded in limits on the judicial power under Article III. That
argument, however, seems speculative.
Professor Wuerth suggests that an advantage of her proposed interpretation
is that whatever protections Congress enacts would apply equally to foreign
corporations and foreign sovereigns.97 In some cases, however, there are
good reasons for treating such entities differently.98 International comity
considerations often dictate according foreign sovereigns stronger
protections than private actors receive—and, indeed, the FSIA provides for
such protections in most situations. At the same time, international law may
justify holding foreign sovereigns accountable for terrorism or other
unlawful acts under principles of universal jurisdiction99 in situations where
a private party’s activities might be considered too remote from the United
States. Moreover, Congress has considerable ability to equalize personal
jurisdiction protections for foreign sovereign enterprises and other foreign
corporations if it so chooses, altering the former through the FSIA and the
latter by, for example, providing more expansively for nationwide
jurisdiction.100
None of this is to say that there might not be value in bringing foreign
sovereigns within the constitutional fold in some fashion. But any theory of
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94. See Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
95. See Cahill, supra note 80.
96. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 685.
97. See id. at 684.
98. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96-99 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (noting comity considerations and structural protections that justify treating foreign
sovereigns differently from other actors).
99. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 126–27 (noting that some legislators have attempted
to justify subjecting foreign nations to suit for acts of terrorism by invoking principles of
universal jurisdiction for certain violations of international law).
100. See supra notes 73–74.
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how to do so should account for existing immunity protections—the primary
means by which Congress has implemented the international norms that have
guided this area since the nation’s beginnings.
CONCLUSION
From the United States’ earliest days, foreign sovereign immunity has
protected the interests of foreign nations in U.S. courts. It has done so despite
the fact that it has generally been seen as a doctrine rooted not in Article III
limits but in international and general law norms. Given this status quo,
advocating for a significant shift in our constitutional understanding may be
premature.
This is not to say that the status quo is perfect or that Professor Wuerth’s
article does not contain valuable insights. Wuerth makes a strong case that
some constitutional protections—such as basic elements of due process—
should also be understood to apply in proceedings involving foreign
sovereigns. As she astutely points out,101 cases like Bank Markazi v.
Peterson,102 in which the Court considered whether Congress’s designation
of specific Iranian assets to be used to satisfy individual judgments violated
“constraints placed on Congress and the President,”103 are difficult to
understand as anything other than a recognition that structural constitutional
protections apply to foreign nations as well.104 It is equally difficult to
imagine that bedrock due process principles such as notice and unbiased
proceedings would not apply to cases involving foreign nations—even
though the exact constitutional mechanism underpinning such an application
of them may be unclear. For this reason, Wuerth’s fundamental call to better
understand the various strands of doctrine applicable to foreign nations and
integrate them with other constitutional mandates is an important
contribution in an area of growing concern.
Foreign sovereign immunity, however, provides an important piece of this
picture as well. Expectations that nonconsenting sovereigns would be mostly
or entirely immune from suit have guided the judicial treatment of foreign
nations from the Constitution’s drafting to the present. Even today, the
FSIA’s territorial nexus requirements shield foreign sovereigns in many
situations, requiring contacts similar to those needed for personal
jurisdiction. Any theory of how foreign sovereigns should be regarded in the
future should take into account how the existing doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity has mostly succeeded in protecting them in the past.

101. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 651–52 (noting that “the entire Supreme Court assumed
without discussion that the Central Bank of Iran was protected by separation of powers
principles limiting congressional power”).
102. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
103. Id. at 1317.
104. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 651–53.

